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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Michael R. Parvin appeals from the district court's judgment of dismissal of his
Petition for Post-Conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing.

On appeal, he

asserts that the district court erred when it found that his attorney's conduct was not
deficient for a number of reasons, including its contention that the Idaho Court of
Appeals' Opinion in State v. Day, 131 Idaho 184 (Ct. App. 1998) and its progeny, have
failed to inform defense attorneys of what is required of them in order to prevent a
district court from losing jurisdiction over Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35)
motions.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
This case began in 1999, when Mr. Parvin pleaded guilty to one count of lewd
conduct with a child under the age of sixteen.

Following his guilty plea, Mr. Parvin

received a sentence of life, with ten years fixed.

Mr. Parvin filed a timely Rule 35

motion, which the district court granted approximately three months later, reducing the
sentence to a unified term of twenty years, with five years fixed. After the State filed a
motion for reconsideration "raising the issue of whether the victims' rights were violated
and otherwise arguing that the court improperly applied the law in granting the motionL]"
the district court, over Mr. Parvin's objection, vacated its order reducing his sentence,
"ruling that the necessary victim notification had not occurred in the Rule 35 proceeding
in violation of the victims' constitutional and statutory rights." State v. Parvin, 137 Idaho
783, 784-85 (Ct. App. 2002).
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On direct appeal from the district court's decision to set aside its order reducing
his sentence, Mr. Parvin argued that the district court's decision was erroneous because
it lacked the authority to do so, had no jurisdiction to consider a motion for
reconsideration, and reinstating the original sentence violated his due process rights
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The State's response was to argue, inter
alia, that the district court lost jurisdiction to act on his Rule 35 motion before it granted it

because it failed to act on the motion in a reasonable amount of time. Ultimately, the
Court of Appeals accepted the State's jurisdictional argument, holding that "the record
proffers insufficient reason for the district court's delay of more than three months in
deciding Parvin's Rule 35 motion[,]" and concluding that "the jurisdiction of the district
court had expired" when it issued the order reducing Mr. Parvin's sentence. Id. at 786.
Following his loss on direct appeal, Mr. Parvin filed a timely Petition for PostConviction Relief, in which he alleged, inter alia, that his Rule 35 counsel was ineffective
for "failing to ensure that his Rule 35 motion was ruled upon in a reasonable period of
time." (R., p.114.) Due to a complete lack of representation by appointed counsel on
his initial Petition, his Petition was dismissed for failure to take action on the matter,
including failing to respond to a notice of intent to dismiss.

(R., p.114.)

When

Mr. Parvin learned of the dismissal, he filed a successive Petition in which he
reasserted the Rule 35 claim and alleged that his successive Petition was proper
because his post-conviction counsel had failed to take any action on his case.
(R., pp.114-15.)

The district court ruled that Mr. Parvin's successive Petition was

proper, but erroneously denied the claim because it believed that it should have been
raised on direct appeal.

(R., p.115.)

In an unpublished opinion, the Idaho Court of
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Appeals vacated the dismissal, and remanded the matter for a decision on the merits.

Parvin v. State, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 453 (April 30, 2012),1 pp.7-8.
On remand, the district court addressed the merits of the claim before dismissing
it.

In doing so, it explained that Mr. Parvin had failed to satisfy the deficient

performance prong.

The reasoning behind the district court's conclusion began by

reasoning that Mr. Parvin had only cited to State

v. Day,

131 Idaho 184 (Ct. App. 1998)

(R., p.8), a case in which the Idaho Court of Appeals found that the district court had
lost jurisdiction to rule on a Rule 35 motion because it waited approximately nine
months from the filing date to do so, and provided a caution to defense attorneys about
their responsibilities to ensure that their clients' Rule 35 motions are decided in a timely
matter, writing,
For future reference, we make it clear that when a defendant files a Rule
35 motion, it will of necessity become defense counsel's responsibility to
precipitate action on the motion within a reasonable time frame, or
otherwise provide an adequate record and justification for delay, to avoid
the risk of the trial court losing jurisdiction to consider the motion.

Day, 131 Idaho at 186 (emphasis in original).
The district court went on to explain that Day and its progeny2 could not support
Mr. Parvin's claim of deficient performance because, in deciding the cases, the Idaho
Court of Appeals failed to "provide the court with any specific information as to how a
defense attorney is to 'precipitate action on the motion' and the cases do not provide
guidance to a court as to what the consequence should be for an attorney to fail to do
so."

(R., p.9.)

The district court then attempted to distinguish the three cases by

1 A copy of the opinion is in the appellate record. (See R., pp.113-20.)
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explaining that "none of the above cited cases are post-conviction cases and the court
was unable to find that post-conviction actions were pursued (at least at the appellate
level) in the above cited cases such that would provide this court with guidance as to
how to evaluate the claims of the Petitioner." (R., p.9.)
Mr. Parvin filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court's judgment of
dismissal. (R., p.137.)

The district court noted that the "sentiment" from the quoted passage "was echoed in"
State v. Payan, 132 Idaho 614,619 (Ct. App. 1998) and State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho
375, 380 (Ct. App. 2003). (R., p.9.)

2
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ISSUE

Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Parvin's Rule 35 claim?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Parvin's Rule 35 Claim

A.

Introduction
On appeal, Mr. Parvin asserts that the district court erred when it dismissed his

claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to take
action to ensure that the district court ruled on his Rule 35 motion while it still had
jurisdiction to do so. Because the undisputed evidence established that his attorney's
performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result, the district court
erred when it dismissed his Petition and denied him relief.

B.

Standard Of Review
Upon review of a district court's denial of a petition for post-conviction relief when

an evidentiary hearing has occurred, Idaho appellate courts will not disturb the district
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho
695, 700 (1999), citing I.R.C.P. 52(a); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67 (Ct. App.1990).
When reviewing mixed questions of law and fact, the appel/ate court defers to the
district court's factual findings supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the
application of the relevant law to those facts. Id. (citation omitted).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Parvin's Rule 35 Claim
Mr. Parvin maintains that the undisputed evidence - culminating in the district

court's findings of fact - require the conclusion that he was entitled to relief because he
established both deficient performance and prejudice.
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1.

The Prejudice Prong

"[I]n a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to pursue a
motion in the underlying criminal action, the court properly may consider the probability
of success of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's inactivity
constituted incompetent performance." Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313,316 (Ct. App.
1995) (citing Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155 (Ct. App. 1993». The Hassett Court upheld
the district court's finding that Hassett was not prejudiced by his attorney's failure to file
a Rule 35 motion because the district court found that it would not have granted the
Rule 35 motion. Id. at 317-18.
Mr. Parvin's case presents the mirror-image of Hassett: we know that the district
court would have granted the Rule 35 motion because it did so, albeit only after lOSing

jurisdiction. While it does not appear that the district court based its order denying his
Petition on a failure to demonstrate prejudice, Mr. Parvin asserts that he has satisfied
the prejudice prong.

2.

The Deficient Performance Prong

The only real issue considered by the district court when dismissing Mr. Parvin's
Petition and denying him relief was whether he had established, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that his Rule 35 attorney was deficient for failing to take any action to
ensure that the district court ruled on the motion before it lost jurisdiction. (R., pp.12733.)
In denying Mr. Parvin post-conviction relief on remand, the district court
explained that it was doing so because Mr. Parvin had failed to satisfy the deficient
performance prong.

The district court began its analysis by criticizing the fact that
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Mr. Parvin only cited to State v. Day, 131 Idaho 184 (Cl. App. 1998) (R., p.8), a case in
which the Idaho Court of Appeals found that the district court had lost jurisdiction to rule
on a Rule 35 motion because it waited approximately nine months from the filing date to
do so, and provided a caution to defense attorneys about their responsibilities to ensure
that their clients' Rule 35 motions are decided in a timely matter, writing,
For future reference, we make it clear that when a defendant files a Rule
35 motion, it will of necessity become defense counsel's responsibility to
precipitate action on the motion within a reasonable time frame, or
otherwise provide an adequate record and justification for delay, to avoid
the risk of the trial court losing jurisdiction to consider the motion.

Day, 131 Idaho at 186 (emphasis in original).
The district court went on to explain that Day and its progenl could not support
Mr. Parvin's claim of deficient performance because, in deciding the cases, the Idaho
Court of Appeals failed to "provide the court with any specific information as to how a
defense attorney is to 'precipitate action on the motion' and the cases do not provide
guidance to a court as to what the consequence should be for an attorney to fail to do
so." (R., p.9.)
The district court then attempted to distinguish the Day, Payan, and Bromgard by
explaining that "none of the above cited cases are post-conviction cases and the court
was unable to find that post-conviction actions were pursued (at least at the appellate
level) in the above cited cases such that would provide this court with guidance as to
how to evaluate the claims of the Petitioner." (R., p.9.)
The district court further reasoned,

The district court noted that the "sentiment" from the quoted passage "was echoed in"
State v. Payan, 132 Idaho 614, 619 (Ct. App. 1998) and State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho
375, 380 (Ct. App. 2003). (R., p.9.)
3
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Parvin has presented no information to this court as to his knowledge or
understanding of any steps that [defense counsel] might have taken to
ensure that Judge Morfitt ruled in a manner in which [sic] the appellate
court determined to be timely. Clearly, there is nothing of record in the
criminal action in which [defense counsel] asked the court to issue a
ruling, or asked the court to set the matter for hearing. However, [defense
counsel] was not called as a witness, by either Parvin or the State, at
either Evidentiary Hearing and so the court is unaware and uninformed of
any actions that [defense counsel] might have informally undertaken to
encourage Judge Morfitt to rule on the motion, or whether [defense
counsel] possessed information about Judge Morfitt's motion practice and
procedures for ruling that discouraged him from seeking more affirmative
action in encouraging Judge Morfitt to issue a ruling.
(R., p.11.)

Thus, the district court provided two bases for finding no deficiency in Rule 35
counsel's failure to ensure that Mr. Parvin's Rule 35 motion was ruled upon before the
district court lost jurisdiction: (1) that, when it issued Day two decades ago and "echoed"
its "sentiment" in later cases, the Idaho Court of Appeals provided no guidance as to
how an attorney is to ensure that a district court take timely action on a Rule 35 motion;
and (2) that Mr. Parvin, who presented uncontroverted evidence that Rule 35 counsel
failed to precipitate a timely ruling on his Rule 35 motion, cannot prevail because he
failed to disprove potential defenses that the State may have been able to assert had it
presented evidence in support thereof.
With respect to the district court's finding that the Idaho Court of Appeals'
decision in Day and its progeny provided neither "specific information as to how a
defense attorney is to 'precipitate action on the motion'" nor "what the consequence
should be for an attorney to fail to do so," Mr. Parvin submits that the district court erred
in each determination. Addressing the latter first, it is clear that the consequence for an
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attorney who fails to ensure that a meritorious Rule 35 motion is ruled upon in a timely
manner is that the defendant may seek relief in post-conviction proceedings.
With respect to the question of how an attorney is supposed to "precipitate
action" on a Rule 35 motion, it is fairly obvious: the attorney should file a request - in
the form of a motion or other filing - with the district court seeking a ruling on the motion
before the district court loses jurisdiction. 4 See Worthington v. Thomas, 134 Idaho 433,
437 (2000) (rejecting claim that judgment was not final because a motion to modify had
been filed because of the party's failure to seek a timely ruling on the motion); Idaho
State Bar v. Clark, 153 Idaho 349, 357 (2012) (upholding a disciplinary committee's

findings that an attorney "did not diligently pursue his client's objectives by filing a
request for a show cause hearing"); State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 586 (Ct. App.
2008) ("It is the appellant's burden to obtain a ruling on his motion") (citing State v.
Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 384 (1999»; I.R.P.C. 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable

diligence and promptness in representing a client.").
As to the remaining basis - that Mr. Parvin should have presented evidence to
negate possible defenses that the State could have raised by presenting evidence - he
notes that once he established a prima facie case based on uncontroverted facts, he
was entitled to relief barring the State presenting evidence and argument to overcome

To the extent that the district court's reasoning depends upon the fact that the district
court could have ignored any such attempts, Mr. Parvin notes that he would then have
an argument that his due process rights were violated by the district court failing to
provide him with a procedure through which to seek meaningful appellate relief from a
denial. Furthermore, Day allows for jurisdiction to be extended by "provid[ing] an
adequate record and justification for delay." Day, 131 Idaho at 186. If a district court's
refusal to perform its lawful duty is not justification for a delay, Rule 35 counsel could
have obtained a writ of mandate from the Idaho Supreme Court compelling the district
court to rule on the motion in a timely manner. See I.C. § 7-302.
4
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his evidence.

The evidence presented by Mr. Parvin was uncontested, and no

credibility determinations were necessary. To the extent that the facts could be said to
be reasonably in dispute, the district court itself found in Mr. Parvin's favor on those
facts, explaining, "Clearly, there is nothing of record in the criminal action in which [sic]
[defense counsel] asked the court to issue a ruling, or asked the court to set the matter
for hearing." (R., p.131 (emphasis added).)
As part of its decision to deny relief based on Mr. Parvin's failure to "rebut" the
State's non-evidence, the district court speculated that Rule 35 counsel may have
known something about the preferences of the district court and that he may have
chosen to avoid antagonizing the district court by requesting a timely ruling. Aside from
the fact that it is entirely speculative and not based on anything in the record, Mr. Parvin
maintains that it would be unreasonable for an attorney to fail to take action on a client's
matter in order to avoid irritating a judge who does not approve of advocacy and due
process. To the extent that it is an issue, Mr. Parvin maintains that neither evidence nor
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct support this reasoning. See I.R.P.C. 1.3.
In light of the fact that the uncontested facts support Mr. Parvin's Rule 35 claim
and request for relief, he maintains that the district court erred when it dismissed his
Petition following an evidentiary hearing. He respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the judgment of dismissal and remand this matter for reinstatement of the original order
granting Rule 35 relief, which modified his sentence from life, with ten years fixed, to a
unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Parvin respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's
judgment of dismissal as to his Rule 35 claim, and remand this matter for entry of an
order reinstating the district court's order granting Rule 35 relief, in which it reduced his
sentence from life, with ten years fixed, to a unified sentence of twenty years, with five
years fixed.
DATED this 5th day of November, 2013.

SPENCERJ.HAHN

Dep~tyState Appellate Public Defender
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